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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
mony cannot be considered as substantive evidence. The Court con-
sidering the "unorthodox view" of Dean Wigmore remarked:
"The previous statement was when made and remains an
ex parte affair, given without oath and test of cross examination.
Important also is the fact that, however much it may have
mangled truth, there was assurance of freedom from prosecu-
tion for perjury. The chief merit of cross examination is not
that at some future time it gives the party opponent the right
to dissect adverse testimony. Its principal virtue is in its im-
mediate application of the testing process. Its strokes fall
while the iron is hot. False testimony is apt to harden and
become unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion as the
witness has opportunity for reconsideration and influence by
the suggestion of others, whose interest may be, and often is to
maintain falsehood rather than truth."20
The Court further remarked that there are additional practical rea-
sons for not attaching anything of substantive evidential value to extra
judicial assertions which come in only as impeachment. It was urged
that such unrestricted use as evidence would increase both temptation
and opportunity for the manufacture of evidence and declarations
extracted by the most extreme of "third degree" methods could easily
be made into affirmative evidence. 21
It is the conclusion of this writer that the ratio decidendi of the
orthodox view in this matter is preferable. Although the Wisconsin
Court in the featured case did not give a detailed consideration to both
positions, it is submitted that the Minnesota Court's reasoning in the
Saporen case, is sound. Obviously any prior inconsistent statement
which violates the rule against hearsay, that is: (1) is not made under
oath; (2) is made without the opportunity for cross examination;
(3) is made without confrontation, would be inadmissible as sub-
stantive evidence. However, even if the statement would be non-
hearsay or fall within its exceptions, it would seem that for the policy
reason of discouraging the manufacture of evidence, it would be more
practical to exclude the prior inconsistent statement as substantive
evidence.
RICHARD GLEN GREENWOOD
Constitutional Law: Obscenity Not Within the Area of Con-
stitutionally Protected Speech or Press- In case No. 582, on cer-
tiorari to the United State Supreme Court, the defendant conducted
a business in New York in the publication and sale of books, photo-
graphs, and magazines. Circulars and advertising matters were used
to solicit sales. Defendant was convicted by a jury in the District
Court for the Southern District of New York upon four counts of a
o See note 17 supra.
21 Ibid.
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twenty-six count indictment charging him with mailing obscene books,
periodicals, photographs, and advertising circulars in violation of the
federal obscenity statute.' His conviction was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.2 In case No. 61, on appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, the defendant conducted a mail order
business from Los Angeles. He was convicted by the judge of the
Municipal Court of the Beverly Hills Judicial District (having waived
a jury trial) under a misdemeanor complaint which charged him with
lewdly keeping for sale obscene and indecent books and with writing,
composing, and publishing an obscene advertisement of them, in vio-
lation of the California Penal Code.3  The conviction was affirmed
by the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of Los Angeles. 4 The United States
Supreme Court in a consolidated opinion held: Both convictions af-
firmed. The federal obscenity statute punishing the mailing of material
that is obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy, or other publications of an
indecent character, and the California obscenity statute making pun-
ishable, inter alia, the keeping for sale or advertising of material that
is obscene or indecent, do not offend constitutional safeguards against
convictions based upon protected material nor do they violate con-
stitutional requirements of due process by failing to give adequate
notice of what is prohibited. 5 Chief Justice Warren, in a separate
' The federal obscenity statute provided, in the pertinent part:
" .... Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, let-
ter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character; and-
".... Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, adver-
tisement, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly,
where, or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned mat-
ters, articles or things may be obtained or made, whether sealed or unsealed.
.....Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the
mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
..... Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing.or delivery, anything declared
by this section to be nonmailable, or knowingly takes the same from the mails
for the purpose of circulating or disposing thereof, or aiding in the circula-
tion or disposition therof, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. . . ." 18 U.S.C. 1461 (1950).
The 1955 amendment of this statute, 69 STAT. 183, is not applicable to this
case. ,
s Roth v. United States, 237 F.2d 796 (2d cir. 1956).
3 The CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE provides, in pertinent part:
"Every person who wilfully and lewdly, either:
"3. Wites, composes; stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, distributes, keeps
for sale, or exhibits any obscene or indecent writing, paper, or book; or de-
signs, copies, draws, engraves, paints, or otherwise prepares any obscene or
indecent picture or print; or molds, cuts, casts, or otherwise makes any ob-
scene or indecent figure; or,
"4. Writes, composes, or publishes any notice or advertisement of any such
writing, paper, book, picture, print or figure; ....
"6.... is guilty of a misdemeanor...." CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. 311 (1955).
4 Alberts v. State of California., 138 Cal App.2d 909, 292 P.2d 90 (1956).
5 No issue was presented in either case concerning the obscenity of the material
involved.
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opinion, concurred in the result but expressed doubts as to the wisdom
of the broad language used in the majority opinion and limited the
decision to the facts before the court and to the validity of the
statutes in question as there applied. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in
the results of the California conviction (case No. 61) but dissented
in the federal obscenity statute conviction (case No. 582) on the
grounds that the regulation of obscenity embodied in the federal
statute was beyond federal power. Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by
Mr. Justice Black, dissented in both cases, asserting that sustaining
the convictions would make the legality of a publication turn on the
purity of thought which a book instills in the mind of a reader rather
than provocation of overt acts or antisocial conduct and therefore the
federal and state statutes were violative of the constiutional guaranties
of free speech and press. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking
for five members of the Court, for the first time squarely lays down
the rule that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally pro-
tected speech or press either: (1) under the First Amendment, as to
Federal Government, or (2) under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as to the states. Numerous cases involving
dicta are cited by the Court indicating that the Court always assumed
that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press.'
The Court then goes on to point out that historically, the uncondi-
tional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect
every utterance-proof of which lies in the fact that the guaranties
of freedom of expression 7 in effect in ten of the fourteen states which
by 1792 had ratified the Constitution, gave no absolute protection for
every utterance. Thirteen of the fourteen states provided for the pro-
secution of libel,s and all of these states made either blasphemy or
profanity, or both, statutory crimes. 9
6 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, at 736-737 (1878); United States v. Chasse,
135 U.S. 255, at 261 (1890) ; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, at 281
(1897) ; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, at 508 (1904); Hoke
v. C.S., 227 U.S. 308, at 322 (1913) ; Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
at 716 (1931) ; Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, at 571-
572 (1942) ; Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, at 158 (1946) ; Winters
v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507, at 510 (1948); Beauharnais
v. People of Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, at 266 (1952).
7 DEL. CONST. art. I,§5 (1792) ; GA. CONST. art. LXI (1777) ; MD. CONST., Decl.
of Rights §38 (1776) ; MAss. CONST., Decl. of Rights art. XVI (1780) ; N. C.
CONST., Decl. art. XLI (1776); S. C. CONST. art. XLIII (1778); VT. CONST.
art. XIV (1777); VA. Decl. of Rights §12 (1776).8 CONN. PUB. STAT. LAWS 355 (1808); DEL. CONST. art 1, §5 (1792); GA.
PENAL CODE, 8th Div. §8 (1817), Digest of the Laws of Ga. 364 (Prince
1822); II MD. PUBLIc GENERAL LAWS 1096 (Poe 1888); Commonwealth v.
Kneeland, 20 Pick. 206, 37 Mass. 206(1838); AcT FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF
CERTAIN CRIMES NOT CAPITAL (1791), LAWS OF N.H. BEc (1792); AcT RE-
SPECTING LIBELS (1799), N.J. REV. LAWS §Dvv AvRJJQ; People v. Crosswell; 3
Johns. Cas. N.Y., 337 (1804); 2 LAWS OF N.C. 999 (1821); PA. CONST. art. 9,
§7 (1790) ; R.I. CODE OF LAWS (1647). Proceedings of the First General As-
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The Court's main argument in support of its holding that obscenity
is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press is
that obscenity is utterly without any redeeming social importance while
only those utterances that form an essential part of an exposition of
ideas having some social value are assured protection by the First
Amendment. 0 The Court expressed the following opinion:
"All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social im-
portance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion- have the full
protection of the guaranties, unless excluadable because they
encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But
implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection
of obscenity as utterly without social importance. This rejection
f6r that reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that ob-
scenity should be restrained, reflected in the international agree-
ment of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all the 48
States, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress
from 1842 to 1956."1
It is submitted, that the controversial part of this decision is the
Court's affirmation of the standard for the judging obscenity as laid
down in a number of lower court decisions ;12 to wit: Whether to the
sembly and Code of Laws 44-45 (1647); R. I. CoNsT. art. 1, §20 (1842); 1
LAWS OF VT. 366 (Tolman 1808); Commonwealth v. Morris, 1 Va. Cas. 176,
3 Va. 176 (1811).9 Act for the Punishment of Divers Capital and Other Felonies, ACTs AND
LAWS OF CONN. 66, 67 (1784); I LAWS OF DEL. 173, 174 (1797); DIGEST OF
LAWS OF GA. 512, 513 (Prince 1822); DIGEST LAWS AND LmERTiES OF MASS.
BAY §3 (1646) ; MASS. BAY COLONY CHARTERS & LAWS 58 (1814) ; REv. STAT.
OF MASS. 741 (1836); LAWS OF N. H. 252, 256 (1792) ; LAWS OF N. H. 258(1792); 2 LAWS OF N.Y. 257, 258 (Jones & Varick 1777-1789); People v.
Ruggles, 8 Johns. R. 290 (1817); 1. N.C. LAWS 52 (Martin Rev. 1715-1790);
ACT To PREVENT THE GRIEVOUS SINS OF CURSING AND SWEARING (1700); II
STATUTES AT LARGE OF PA. 49 (1700-1712) ; ACT FOR THE PREVENTION OF VICE
AND IMMORALITY §11 (1794), 3 LAWS OF PA. 177, 178 (1791-1802); ACT TO
REFORM THE PENAL LAWS §33, 34 (1798), LAWS OF R. I. 584, 595 (1798);
ACT FOR THE MORE EFFECTUAL SUPPRESSING OF BLASPHEMY AND PROPHANENESS
(1703), LAWS OF S. C. 4 (Grimke 1790); ACT FOR THE PUNISHIIENT OF CER-
TAIN CAPITAL, AND OTHER HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANERS §BJ (1797), 1
LAWS OF VT. 352, 339 (Tolman 1808); ACT, FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF CER-
TAIN INFERIOR CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS §20 (1797), 1 LAWS OF VT. 352,
361 (Tolman 1808) ; ACT FOR THE EFFECTUAL SUPPRESSION OF VICE §1 (1792),
ACTS OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VA. 286 (1794).
10 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 571-572 (1942).
11 L. Ed. 2d 1507 (1957).
12E. g., Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D. C. Cir. 1945); Parmelee v.
U.S., 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940); U.S. v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d cir.
1936); U.S. v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d cir. 1930) ; Khan v. Leo Feist Inc.,
D.C., 70 F.Supp. 450 affd, 165 F2d 188 (2d. cir. 1947); U.S. v. One Book
Called "Ulysses." D.C., 5 FSupp 182, affd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d cir.
1934); American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 Il.2d334, 121
N.E.2d 585 (1954) ; Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840(1945); State of Missouri v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 272 S.W2d 283 (1954);
Adams Theatre Co. v. Keenan, 17 N.J. 267, 96 A.2d 519 (1953); Bantam
Books, Inc., v. ±Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A.2d 47 (1953) ; Commonwealth
v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D.&C. 101, affd sub nor. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum,
166 Pa.Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950) ; cf. Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, at
794-795 (2d cir. 1949).
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average person, applying contemporary community standards, the domi-
nant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient
interest.' 3
Two of the four dissenting justices, Mr. Justices Douglas and
Black, attack this standard of obscenity applicable to the statutes in
question, on the grounds that punishment is inflicted for thoughts pro-
voked without proof either that the obscene material will perceptibly
create a clear and present danger of anti-social conduct' 4 or will
probably induce its recipients to such conduct. 15 These dissenting jus-
tices express their fears by stating:
"For the test that suppresses a cheap tract today can sup-
press a literary gem tomorrow. All it need do is to incite a
lascivious thought or arouse a lustful desire. The list of books
that judges can place in that category is endless."'1
In a separate opinion, Justice Harlan dissented to the conviction
under the federal obscenity statute in case No. 582. He asserts that
the federal government has no business under any power whatsoever
to bar the sale of books because they might lead to "any kind of
thoughts." He contends that the interests which obscenity statutes pro-
tect are primarily entrusted to state care and not to the Federal Gov-
ernment. The Federal Government's sphere of control, as he sees it,
is pretty well limited to regulations of hard-core pornography. He
does, however, concur in the conviction under the California obscenity
statute in case No. 61. on the ground that the legislation by its very
language does not, as does the federal statute, attempt to punish on
the ground that obscene material excites lustful thoughts. The Cali-
fornia law is saved, Harlan feels, because it assumes that obscene
material can "deprave or corrupt" the reader and therefore induce
criminal or immoral sexual conduct. This, says Harlan, presents a
debatable issue which prevents him from substituting his judgment for
that of the California Legislature.
The majority approach causes Justice Harlan to fear that the
broad standard for judging obscenity, as laid down therein, may result
in a loosening of the tight reins which the state and federal appellate
courts should hold upon the enforcement of obscenity statutes. He
reasons that it will tend to obscure the peculiar responsibilities resting
on the appellate courts of determining for themselves whether the
attacked expression is suppresable within constitutional standards, and
13 I.e., material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts. Webster's New
International Dictionary (Unabridged 2d ed. 1949) defines prurient, in per-
tinent part, as follows:
" ....Itching; longing; uneasy with desire or longing; of persons, having
itching, morbid, or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity, or propensity,
lewd ......
14 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
15 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
iG 354 U.S. at 476.
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thus encourage them to rely on easy labeling and jury verdicts, which
in effect leaves the fate of a particular book at the mercy of possible
unqualified lower court judges and juries.
There appears to be good reason for not inducing the appellate
courts to relax their control. It does seem that the question whether
a particular book may be suppressed is not a mere matter of classi-
fication of "fact" to be entrusted to a fact finder, be it judge or jury,
but a question of constitutional judgment which the appellate courts
must determine for themselves.
As Justice Harlan states:
"Every communication has an individuality and 'value' of its
own. The suppression of a particular writing or other tangible
form of expression is, therefore, an individual matter, and in
the nature of things every such suppression raises an individual
constitutional problem, in which a reviewing court must deter-
mine for itself whether the attacked expression is suppressable
within constitutional standards. Since those standards do not
readily lend themselves to generalized definitions, the consti-
tutional problem in the last analysis becomes one of particu-
larized judgments which appellate courts must make for them-
selves."
1 7
In the only other Supreme Court case to raise the question of
constitutional protection for those charged with publishing or selling
obscene literature, Doubleday & Co. v. New York, s the eight justices 9
who sat, divided four-to-four and, as is the custom in such cases,
there was no announcement as to who voted which way and no opinion
was rendered clarifying the question. It should be noted that defendant
publishing company's brief centered solely on the contention that
works of literature, both fictional and non-fictional, dealing with sex
problems are entitled to the same constitutional protection as any
other literature and can be suppressed only when the publication
created a "clear and present danger" to the substantial interest of
the state.
After careful thought, it is this writer's opinion that if the de-
fendants, in the instant case, had not in the past been old hands at
publishing and surreptitiously mailing lurid pictures and materials for
profit,2" the decision in the instant case would have at best resulted
in a four-to-four deadlock, as in the Doubleday case with a very good
likelihood of a five-to-four vote against conviction. This conclusion
is reached through a careful study of Mr. Chief Justice Warren's
concurring opinion, which was the fifth vote for conviction in the in-
171 L. Ed. 2d at 1514.
is297 N.Y. 687, 335 U.S. 848 (1948).
19 Justice Frankfurter did not participate.
20 Defendant Roth previously convicted on similar charges, Roth v. Goldman,
172 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1949).
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stant case. The Chief Justice, in limiting the majority opinion to the
facts of this particular case, stated that it was not the book on trial
but the person.. The conduct of the defendant is the central issue with
the nature of the book as an attribute of the defendant's conduct. He
sums up the case as:
"The personal element in these cases is seen most strongly
in the requirement of scienter. Under California law, the pro-
hibited activity must be done 'willfully and lewdly.' The federal
statute limits the crime to acts done 'knowingly.' In his charge
to the jury, the district judge stated that the matter must be
'calculated' to corrupt or debauch. The defendants in both
these cases were engaged in the business of purveying textual
or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic
interests of their customers. They were plainly engaged in
the commercial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving
for materials with prurient effect. I believe that the State and
Federal Governments can constitutionally punish such conduct.
That is all we need to decide."
2 1
Under this view, a publisher of a book which tends to arouse lustful
thuoghts in its readers would not be convicted unless it was proven
that he willingly and/or knowingly published the book with the in-
tention of arousing the prurient interests of his customers.
However, in spite of Mr. Chief Justice Warren's attitude, the
chance that the holding of the instant case would be reversed where
the defendant was not shown to have the necessary scienter seems
very remote in the face of another Supreme Court decision handed
down on the same day as the instant case. This decision, Kingsley
Books v. Brown,2 2 was allegedly based on the instant decision, and
held that Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not
violated by a state statute which authorizes the chief executive or legal
officer of a municipality in which a person, firm, or corporation sells
or distributes, or is about to sell or distribute, obscene written and
printed matter, to maintain an action for an injunction to prevent the
sale or distribution. The Kingsley case also ended in a five-to-four
decision for conviction, but in this decision, Chief Justice Warren
was on the side of the dissent, stating that the case was not a criminal
obscenity action but one wherein the New York police, under a dif-
ferent state statute than the one used in the instant case, summarily
seized books which, in their opinion, were unfit for public use because
of obscenity and then obtained a court order for their condemnation
and destruction. Thus in fact, the law put the book on the stand and
not its manner of use. It therefore seems that the majority opinion in
the instant case is accepted as the law unaffected by the qualifying
concurring opinion of Chief Justice Warren.
21 1 L. Ed.2d at 1513.
22 77 S.Ct. 1325 (1957).
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Does this then mean that the fear of the dissent, in the instant
case, that the standard of obscenity as so adopted will suppress the
"literary gem" of tomorrow if it in any way incites a lascivious
thought or arouses a lustful desire, is based upon well founded
grounds? This writer tends to answer this question in the negative
after a thorough investigation of the lower court decisions2 3 from
which the instant case drew its standard for judging obscenity. Books
of "literary distinction" or works which have "an accepted place in
the arts," including Ovid's Art of Love and Boccacio's Decarneron
have been held not to be within obscenity statutes.2 4 Works of phy-
siology, medicine, science, and sex instruction are not within obscenity
statutes, though to some extent and among some persons they may
tend to promote lustful thoughts. 25 Realistically coarse scenes and
vulgar words were held not to be obscene in themselves but they are
considered in determining the dominant effect of the book on its
average readers.26 The dominant theme of the book must be obscene,
27
although if an objectionable part is totaly irrelevant to an unobjection-
able dominant theme, the book is usually found obscene.28 Introduc-
tion into evidence of literary criticisms and classical books of a com-
parable nature are admissible.2 9 Even the Court in the instant case
referred to certain exceptions to the general standard:
"However, sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene
material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing
to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature
and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny ma-
terial and constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press."2 0
Considering these exceptions in light of the standard for judging
obscenity as adopted in the instant case, along with the fact that all
forty-eight states have obscenity statutes,31 this writer is of the
opinion that the danger of infringement upon the constitutional rights
of freedom of speech and press does not lie in the standard for
judging obscenity but in whom this power of judging will finally rest.
23 See note 12 supra.
24 See e.g., United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, at 157 (2d cir. 1936); United
States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F.Supp. 182 (S.D. N.Y. 1933).
72 F.2d 705 (2d cir. 1934) ; Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788 (2d cir. 1930).
25 United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d cir. 1930).
26 Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
27 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705 (2d cir. 1934).
28 See note 26 supra.
29 See notes 20 & 27, supra.
30 See note 11 supra at 1508.
31 Hearings before Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, pursuant to S. Res. 62, 84th Con., 1st Sess.
49-52 (May 24, 1955). Although New Mexico has no general obscenity statute,
it does have a statute giving to municipalities the power "to prohibit the sale
or exhibiting of obscene or immoral publications, prints, pictures, or illustra-
tions." N. M. STAT. ANN., §§ 14-21-3, 14-21-12 (1953).
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There is much criticism 32 as to whether a trial judge or jury could
properly apply a standard calling for such generalized definitions as:
average person, community standards, dominant theme as a whole, and
prurient interest. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent, asserts a solution
to these criticisms when he states that the question whether a particular
work is obscene involves not really an issue of fact but a question of
constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind. He
illustrates this contention most persuasively:
"Many juries might find that Joyce's 'Ulysses' or Bocaccio's
'Decameron' was obscene, and yet the conviction of a defendant
for selling either book would raise, for me, the gravest con-
stitutional problems, for no such verdict could convince me,
without more, that these books are 'utterly without redeeming
social importance.' 33
ERWIN J. KEUP
Military Law: Coercion and Duress as a Defense to Collabo-
rating with the Enemy- Lieutenant Colonel Harry Fleming was
captured by the Chinese Communist forces near the Yalu River in
North Korea in October 1950. He was held as a prisoner of war in
various prison camps in North Korea. Upon his return to the United
States he was court martialed. The charge against Fleming was that
he, while a prisoner of war, did willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
collaborate, communicate and hold intercourse directly with the enemy
by joining with, participating in, and leading discussion groups and
classes reflecting views and opinions that the United Nations and the
United States were illegal aggressors in the Korean conflict, and by
participating in the preparation and making communist propaganda
recordings designed to promote disloyalty and disaffection among the
United States troops, by praising the enemy and attacking the war
aims of the United States. The charge was substantiated by the
evidence.
The evdence also showed the pressure and privation which the
prisoner Fleming had to endure. Immediately before his capture he
was wounded about the back and legs. For ten days after his capture
he was given no food or water. He was forced to march seventy miles
to the prison camp in that condition, and during that time he was fre-
quently questioned. Each time he refused to answer he was physically
abused by being kicked, slapped and pushed. Due to wounds, mis-
treatment, malnutrition and debilitation he lost about forty pounds. At
the camp the prisoners were so crowded that there was not enough
room for them to lie down at night and stretch out. They were not
given winter clothing or shoes, and the food ration consisted of but
32 Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution,
38 MiNN. L. REV. 295, 391. (1938).
:3 See note 11 supra at 1514.
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